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A COMPARISON OF THE ROLE OF THE
EMPLOYER IN THE FRENCH AND U.S. HEALTH
CARE SYSTEMS
Kathryn L. Moore
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is unique among developed nations in its heavy
reliance on employment-based health insurance.1 The United States,
however, is not the only nation in which employers play an important
role in the financing of health care. Indeed, long before employmentbased health insurance became common in the United States, countries
with social insurance systems, such as France, Germany, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic, provided for the delivery of mandatory social
insurance benefits, including health insurance, through the workplace.2
This article explores the role of the employer in the health care
system in one such country: France. The French health care system
merits study because in 2000 the World Health Organization ranked the
system the best in the world based on its reputation for universal
coverage, responsiveness to patient needs, and positive health outcomes,
including longevity, infant mortality, and population health status.3
* Laramie L. Leatherman Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. The
author would like to thank Lucy Roberts for her helpful insights into the French health care system
and James Donovan, Gordon Mowen, Ryan Valentin, and Eric Biscopink for their research
assistance.
1. PIERRE-LOUIS BRAS & DIDIER TABUTEAU, LES ASSURANCES MALADIE 19-20 (2010)
(describing the American system as unique); Jacob S. Hacker, Review Article: Dismantling the
Health Care State? Political Institutions, Public Policies and the Comparative Policies of Health
Reform, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 693, 697 (2004) (noting that the United States is the only advanced
industrial state to rely principally on voluntary employment-based health insurance).
2. SHERRY A. GLIED, The Employer-Based Health Insurance System: Mistake or
Cornerstone, in POLICY CHALLENGES IN MODERN HEALTH CARE 37, 39 (David Mechanic et al.
eds., 2005).
3. World Health Organization [WHO], The World Health Report 2000 – Health Systems:
Improving Performance, at 153 (2000). But see Victor G. Rodwin, The Health Care System under
French National Health Insurance: Lessons for health reform in the United States, in UNIVERSAL
HEALTH INSURANCE IN FRANCE HOW SUSTAINABLE? ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 59, 59 (2006) (noting that the methodology used in assessment has been criticized but that
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This article begins by providing an overview of the French health
care system. It then discusses the role of the employer in the French
health care system. Finally, it compares the role of the employer in the
French system with the role of the employer in the U.S. health care
system.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
The French health care system is a unique blend of public and
private health insurance based on a compromise between two competing
ideologies: egalitarianism and liberalism.4 Under the egalitarian ethos,
all citizens are considered to be equal and thus entitled to equal access to
health care.5 Liberalism, on the other hand, refers to the market-based
economy6 and protects choice and competition in the provision of health
care.7 French politicians claim that the French health care system is the
ideal synthesis of “solidarity and liberalism,” lying between Britain’s
“nationalized” system which rations health care too much and the
American “competitive” system which leaves too many individuals
uninsured.8
The French health care system consists of two tiers:9 (1) mandatory
French health care system is still impressive).
4. DAVID G. GREEN & BENEDICT IRVINE, HEALTH CARE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY:
LESSONS FOR THE UK 29 (Civitas 2001); see also Monika Steffen, The French Health Care System:
Liberal Universalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 353, 356 (2010) (noting that “the French
system combines and develops simultaneously what elsewhere would appear as contradictory,
universalism and choice”).
5. GREEN & IRVINE, supra note 4, at 29; see also Paul Clay Sorum, France Tries to Save its
Ailing Health Insurance System, 26 J. OF PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 231, 241 (2005) (stating that “like
most other developed countries, France remains committed, in the name of social solidarity, to the
access of all its citizens (if not necessarily, in the Raffinin government, to all its residents) to the
same basic health care”).
6. Victor G. Rodwin, The Health Care System Under French National Health Insurance:
Lessons for Health Reform in the United States, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 31 (2003) (noting that
liberalism is “a term understood in much of Europe to mean market-based economic systems”).
7. GREEN & IRVINE, supra note 4, at 29.
8. Rodwin, supra note 6, at 31. In 2010, the American health care system was
fundamentally reformed with the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Affordable Care Act). Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by Pub. L. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (2010). Among other things, the Affordable Care Act was intended to address the
problem of uninsurance in this country. Nancy-Ann DeParle, The Affordable Health Care Act Helps
America’s Uninsured, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sep. 16, 2010, 2:33PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/16/affordable-care-act-helps-america-s-uninsured.
Whether it will do so remains to be seen.
9. See YUKATA IMAI ET AL., The Changing Health System in France, in UNIVERSAL
HEALTH INSURANCE IN FRANCE: HOW SUSTAINABLE? ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 79, 81 (2006).
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public health insurance, sometimes referred to as “statutory” health
insurance,10 and (2) voluntary,11 mostly private, health insurance,
sometimes referred to as “complementary” health insurance.12 Coverage
under the first tier is universal.13 About 90 percent of the French
population has second tier voluntary private health coverage.14
A. First Tier – Mandatory Public Health Insurance
The first tier mandatory public health insurance is provided through
the country’s extensive social security system.15 Established in 1945,16
the French social security system originally only covered workers and
their families.17 In 1961, coverage was extended to farmers, and in

10. See, e.g., ISABELLE DURAND-ZALESKI, The French Health Care System, 2012, in
INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS (The Commonwealth Fund, 2012); Karine
Chevreul et al., France: Health System Review, at 17 (Health Sys. in Transition, Vol. 12 No. 6,
2010).
11. Effective January 1, 2016, employment-based complementary health insurance will
become mandatory. See France Enacts the Labor Law Reform Act, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE
(JORDAN), 2013 WLNR 16536778 (July 8, 2013) [hereinafter Labor Law Reform Act].
12. Some authorities distinguish between “complementary” and “supplementary” insurance,
though not necessarily in an entirely uniform manner. Compare Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at
69-70 (treating “complementary” insurance as insurance that “covers the discrepancy between
[statutory health insurance] coverage and health care expenses” and treating “supplementary”
insurance as insurance as covering services not covered by statutory health insurance) with World
Health Organization Europe [WHO], What are the equity, efficiency, cost containment and choice
implications of private health-care funding in western Europe? (July 2004) (stating that both
“complementary” and “supplementary” private health insurance provide coverage for services
excluded or not fully covered by statutory health insurance but that the main purpose of
“supplementary” insurance is to “increase the choices of provider. . . and level of inpatient hotel
amenities”); see also Sarah Thomson & Elias Mossialos, Private health insurance and access to
health care in the European Union, EURO OBSERVER: NEWSLETTER OF THE EUROPEAN
OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS AND POLICIES, Spring 2004, at 2 (stating that complementary
insurance covers “services excluded or not fully covered by the state,” while supplementary
insurance “provides cover for faster access and increased consumer choice.”).
13. See IMAI ET AL., supra note 9, at 81.
14. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 65.
15. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Agnes Couffinhaul, Private Health Insurance in France,
8 (OECD Health, Working Paper No., 12, 2004). The French Social Security system provides
compulsory protection of (1) health (disease, maternity, incapacity, and death), (2) work-related
illness and injuries, (3) family allowances, and (4) retirement (pension and widowhood). Chevreul
et al., supra note 10, at 20.
16. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 19. France’s first statutory health insurance system was
established in 1930. This system was replaced by the Social Security system in 1945. SIMONE
SANDIER ET AL., Historical Background, Organizational Structure, and Management, in
UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN FRANCE: HOW SUSTAINABLE? ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 129, 136 (2006).
17. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 20.
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1966, coverage was further extended to the self-employed.18 Because
coverage under the Social Security system was linked to employment
status, gaps in coverage existed for certain low-income and unemployed
individuals.19 In 2000, Couverture Maladie Universale (CMU) extended
basic health insurance to all legal residents of France, regardless of
employment status or prior contributions to the Social Security system.20
The entire French population is now covered by the first tier mandatory
public health insurance.21
1. Structure of System
Mandatory health insurance under the social security system is
divided into three main regimes or schemes.22 The first regime or
scheme is the general regime (régime général).23 It covers employees in
commerce and industry and their families as well as individuals who
receive CMU.24 The general regime is by far the most significant in
terms of coverage; it covers more than 85% of the French population.25
The second regime is the agricultural regime (mutualité sociale
18. See id. at 20. Coverage was extended to students in 1948 and career soldiers in 1949. Id.
at 54.
19. Statutes were enacted in 1974 to extend coverage to individuals who were not otherwise
covered by the social security system. In order to receive coverage, individuals were required to
contribute to the system, or request the department to contribute on their behalf if they had
insufficient means. As a practical matter, however, access to public insurance remained
problematic for some groups. Id. at 20.
20. See Martine M. Bellanger et al., The “Health Benefit Basket” in France, 6 EUR. J.
HEALTH ECON. S24, S24 (Supp. 1 2005). CMU “changed the old system of individual insurance,
with contributions that could be financed by the general councils according to income scales that
varied from one department to another, to a system based on the logic of the right to social
protection through insurance. Since this reform, those whose income is below a certain level (2.3%
of the population in 2006) are entitled to free public coverage.” Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at
21.
21. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 17, 54.
22. Steffen, supra note 4, at 357.
23. See Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24.
24. See id.
25. Not surprisingly, estimates of coverage vary. For example, according to one authority,
employees in commerce and industry and their families constitute about 84% of the French
population while CMU was estimated to cover about 2.4% of the population in 2003. See id, at
S24. According to another source, CMU extended coverage to 0.4% of the French population.
DURAND-ZALESKI, supra note 10, at 39. According to yet a third source, the general scheme
“covers 56 million employees in commerce and industry and their families (87% of the population)
and CMU beneficiaries (1.4 million people, 2.3% of the population in 2006).” Chevreul et al.,
supra note 10, at 28. See also Pierre Loiseau, When the Clouds Hung Oppressively Low in the
Heavens: Unhealth Cost-Cutting in France and in the U.S., 70 LA. L. REV. 945, 946 (2010) (stating
that the general regime covers 80% of the French population).
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agricole).26 It covers farmers and agricultural workers and their
families, which constitute about 7% of the French population.27 The
third regime is the regime for the non-agricultural self-employed
(CANAM).28 It covers the 5% or so of the population that is selfemployed, such as self-employed professionals like lawyers and
craftsmen.29 The remainder of the French population is covered by ten
or so other work-related schemes.30
Each of the three major regimes consists of a national health
insurance fund and local structures that correspond to the geographic
distribution of their members.31 For example, the general regime has
more than 100 local funds and 16 regional funds.32
2. Management
Each fund is a “self-governing unit, with a management board
composed of an equal number of representatives of employer and trade
unions,”33 as well as representatives of the mutual insurance associations
and individuals appointed by the Minister of Health.34

26. See Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24.
27. See id. Cf. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 28 (stating that the agricultural regime
covers “3.6 million people or around 6% of the population”).
28. Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24.
29. See id.; see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 28 (stating that the self-employed
regime covers 3.4 million people or about 5% of the population).
30. Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24; see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 28-29
(noting that some of the smaller schemes are linked to the general regime while others have their
organization and function independently; for historical reasons, individuals from the Alsace and
Moselle regions have their own specific scheme with better coverage in return for higher
contributions).
31. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 29.
32. Again, specific estimates vary. For example, according to one authority, the general
regime has 16 regional funds and 105 local funds. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 29. According
to another authority, the general regime has 16 regional funds and 133 local funds. GREEN &
IRVINE, supra note 4, at 30. The regional funds’ responsibilities are limited to work-related
accidents and illnesses. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 29.
33. GREEN & IRVINE, supra note 4, at 30. Agricultural workers, independent professions,
civil servants, medical doctors, and students are covered by seventeen other funds. Id. Prior to
1967, representatives of employees constituted a majority of the elected boards of director of the
insurance funds. In 1967, “elections to the board of directors were discontinued and replaced by a
system of appointment by trade unions, with parity between employers and employees.” SANDIER
ET AL., supra note 16, at 139.
34. SANDIER ET. AL., supra note 16, at 155. For a more detailed discussion of the
management of the health care funds, see infra Part II.
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3. Coverage
The mandatory health insurance covers medical goods and services
such as hospital care, outpatient care, diagnostic services,
pharmaceuticals, and health-care related transportation.35 In order to be
eligible for coverage, the services or treatment must have been provided
or prescribed by a doctor, dentist or midwife, and distributed by a health
care professional or institution registered by the mandatory health
insurance program.36
Coverage varies depending on whether it is provided on an
outpatient or inpatient basis. Covered outpatient services are specifically
identified in official lists displayed on the mandatory health insurance
program’s web site.37 The lists are defined at the national level and
apply throughout the country.38 Reimbursement for hospital care is
provided on a diagnosis-related group (DRG) basis rather than on a
procedure by procedure basis.39 Unless specified otherwise, hospital
clinicians can decide what care to provide and what drugs to prescribe
(so long as the drugs have market authorization).40
Initially, mandatory health insurance was intended to provide
curative care for illnesses and accidents, rather than preventive care.41
Over the years, however, coverage has extended to include more and
more preventive care. For example, coverage is now provided for
compulsory and recommended immunizations as well as
mammograms.42
Historically, the French health care system has been generous in
terms of coverage,43 partly because the tendency had been to add items
35. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 55.
36. See id; see also Bellanger, et al., supra note 20, at S26 (“The reimbursement of goods and
services depends on their inclusion in positive lists, according to Articles L.162-1-7, L.162-17, and
L. 165-1 of the [Social Security Code].”).
37. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 55-56. There are three official lists: (1) a list of
covered procedures, (2) a list of reimbursable drugs, and (3) a list of reimbursable medical devices
and health materials. Id. The Ministry of Health is responsible for identifying the covered drugs
and medical devices while the National Union of Health Insurance Funds is responsible for the list
of covered procedures. Id. at 57. The official website is found at www.amelia.fr. See ISABELLE
DURAND-ZALESKI & KARINE CHEVREUL, The French Health Care System, 2011, in
INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, at 45 (The Commonwealth Fund, 2011).
38. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 57.
39. See id., at 17; Bellanger, et al., supra note 20, at S26.
40. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 56.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See Steffen, supra note 4, at 363 (“From patients’ point of view, the French health system
is indeed generous. It offers universal access and high quality and affords each individual the
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to the covered lists but never to delete them.44 In recent years, however,
some services, and especially drugs with no proven efficacy, have been
eliminated from the coverage list.45 In addition, there are a few
categories of care where public health insurance benefits are quite
limited, such as for eyeglasses, dental care, and non-dental prostheses.46
Generally, individuals are expected to pay for the full cost of
ambulatory care at the time services are provided and wait for
reimbursement from their health insurance fund.47 Hospital care, in
contrast, is generally paid for directly by the health funds.48
4. Co-payments
Although the mandatory insurance system is generally generous in
terms of the services and drugs it covers, it typically does not cover
100% of the costs.49 Although reimbursement rates varied with the
particular scheme in the past, the reimbursement rates are now uniform
across the schemes.50 The level of reimbursement depends on the
category of care or service.51 For example, the mandatory health
choice to consult general practitioners and specialists as well as to receive outpatient care at a public
hospital or private clinic in often comparable financial conditions.”).
44. See Chevreul et al, supra note 10, at 59; see also Steffen, supra note 4, at 363 (“[T]he
rational interests of the actors involved – doctors, patients, unions, health industries, local
politicians, and political parties – all converged to develop rather than to limit medical services and
free access. Only those responsible for public finances pursued and continue to pursue a restrictive
policy.”).
45. See Chevreul et al, supra note 10 at 59; see also Steffen, supra note 4, at 369 (discussing
efforts to limit coverage under mandatory health insurance).
46. See Buchmeuller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 10-11.
47. See Chevreul et al, supra note 10, at 54. There are, however, exceptions to the
requirement that the patient make the initial direct payment. For example, CMU beneficiaries are
not required to make initial payments nor are individuals involved in occupational accidents and
patients admitted to the hospital. In addition, third party payments may be used in laboratories,
pharmacies, hospital consultations and outpatient clinics and by some doctors for expensive
examinations and treatments. Id.
48. See id. at 55.
49. See id. at 59. Full reimbursement in available in three instances: (1) individuals suffering
from one of 30 specified long-term illnesses may be entitled to 100% reimbursement for treatment
related to those diseases; (2) certain hospital and fertility treatments are fully reimbursed; and (3)
full reimbursement is available for work accidents, pregnant women after the fifth month of
pregnancy, and disabled children and pensioners. Id. at 61; see also id. at 62 tbl 3.9 (listing 30
illnesses eligible for 100% reimbursement); cf. Steffen, supra note 4, at 365 (stating that the
“authorizing list has grown to thirty-one pathologies”). For a comparison of cost sharing under the
French, German, and Swiss health care systems, see KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, COST SHARING
FOR HEALTH CARE: FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SWITZERLAND (2009).
50. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 59.
51. See id. at 59.
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insurance system generally reimburses 80% of the cost of inpatient
care,52 70% of the cost of doctor and dentist visits,53 60% of the cost of
services provided by laboratories, and 65% of the cost of most drugs.54
Co-payments (‘ticket modérateurs’),55 that is, the requirement that
insureds pay for a portion of the cost of care, were instituted to moderate
demand.56 Over the years, the patients’ share of costs has steadily
increased.57 The ability of co-payments to rein in costs, however, has
been limited because of the prevalence of the second tier voluntary
complementary insurance, which generally covers most of the costs not
covered by the mandatory insurance system.58
In 2005, the government introduced additional flat co-payments.59
52. The reimbursement rate increases to 100% after the 31 st day of a hospital stay, for certain
surgeries, and maternity care. In addition, patients have to pay a flat-rate catering fee of €18 per day
for hospital accommodations. See id. at 60.
53. Generally, costs for treatment procedures and tests that exceed €91 are fully covered. Id.
Since 2006, however, most patients have had to pay a flat rate of €18 for such treatment and
procedures. See id. at 63.
54. See id. at 60 tbl 3.8. Non-substitutable or expensive drugs are reimbursed at the rate of
100% while drugs judged to have a low medical benefit are reimbursed at the rate of 15%. See id.
at 60.
55. See Lisa Gentile, The Battle for Health in France: The Role of Ideas and Discourse in
Constructing the Political Economy of Policy Reform (1990-2010), at 162 n. 212. (Sept. 2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (explaining the origin of the term ticket
moderateur and its evolution in France).
56. See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 146; see also Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra
note 15, at 10 (“As the name suggests, the purpose of the ticket modérateur is to reduce the moral
hazard associated with insurance coverage.”); cf. Steffen, supra note 4, at 360 (stating that the
reason the first tier mandatory health insurance funds only provided partial reimbursement was
because private and decentralized mutual benefit societies were widespread at the time the statutory
system was introduced and the mutual benefit societies were the only institutions with the technical
expertise to run a health insurance scheme); VICTOR G. RODWIN & SIMONE SANDIER, Health Care
Under French National Health Insurance: A Public-Private Mix, Low Prices and High Volume, in
UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN FRANCE HOW SUSTAINABLE? ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 169, 170 (2006) (“The attachment to la medicine libérale and to cost sharing rests on
the principle of liberalism – the notion that there should be freedom of choice for physicians and
patients and some direct responsibility for payment by patients.”).
57. See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 146 (“Over the years, the patient’s share of
treatment costs has steadily increased by means of progressive increments, the introduction of a
daily charge in hospitals and authorizations for Sector 2 doctors and for certain services, such as
dentures and artificial limbs”); see also Jason J. Kilborn, Comparative Cause and Effect: Consumer
Insolvency and the Eroding Social Safety Net, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 563, 587 (2008) (“[I]n 1993,
the reimbursement level for medical services and drugs that were not fully reimbursable fell 5%
(from 75% to 70% for medical services, 70% to 65% for major prescription drugs, and 40% to 35%
for drugs for non-serious conditions)”).
58. See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 146; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at
10-11; Gentile, supra note 55, at 162-63.
59. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 63 (describing additional flat co-payments and
stating that they were introduced to raise additional revenue).
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Under these additional co-payments, individuals must pay €1 for every
doctor visit and test up to €4 per day and €50 per year, and €2 for each
medical transport by ambulance or medical taxi, and €0.50 for each
drug, up to a second ceiling of €50.60 These additional co-payments may
be more effective in moderating demand than the ticket moderateurs
because voluntary health insurance is prohibited from picking up these
additional co-payments.61
In addition, a gatekeeping element was introduced to moderate
demand.62 Historically, no individual or entity served as a gatekeeper in
the French health care system.63 Rather, individuals had the freedom to
choose their doctors and other medical care providers. 64 Under the new
gatekeeping element, visits to a registered gatekeeping general
practitioner (GP) and/or specialist recommended by a gatekeeping GP
are reimbursed at the rate of 70% while visits outside of the gatekeeping
system may only be reimbursed at the rate of 50%.65 Voluntary health
insurance is prohibited from reimbursing the rate differential.66
5. Financing
Traditionally, mandatory health insurance was financed almost
exclusively by “social contributions” (cotisations socials) imposed on
both employers and employees.67 The social contributions, like the
payroll taxes used to fund the U.S. Social Security system,68 are based

60. See id.
61. See supra Part 2.A.5.
62. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 71.
63. See Jean-Pierre Poullier & Simone Sandier, Reconsidering the Role of Competition in
Health Care Markets, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 899, 899 (2000); see also RODWIN &
SANDIER, supra note 56, at 176. Recently, however, the system introduced a gatekeeping element
under which visits to a gatekeeping general practitioner (GP) are reimbursed at the rate of 70%
while visits to other GPs may only be reimbursed at the rate of 50%, and voluntary health insurance
is prohibited from reimbursing the rate differential. DURAND-ZALESKI & CHEVREUL, supra note
37, at 47; see also Bellanger, et al., supra note 20, at S27 (discussing new gatekeeping rules);
Steffen, supra note 4, at 368-69.
64. Poullier & Sandier, supra note 63, at 899; RODWIN & SANDIER, supra note 56, at 176.
Indeed, French doctors have insisted on the system retaining the principles of independent medical
practice, specifically, free choice of doctor, freedom to prescribe, professional confidentiality, and
direct payment of fees by patients. SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 142.
65. DURAND-ZELESKI & CHEVREUL, supra note 37, at 47; Bellanger, et al., supra note 20, at
S27; Steffen, supra note 4, at 368-69.
66. See supra Part 2.A.5.
67. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 20; Steffen, supra note 4, at 357; BRUNO PALIER,
GOUVERNER LA SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 81 (2005).
68. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (2012).
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on a percentage of compensation.69 As the cost of health care increased,
so too did the social contribution rate.70 By 1992, the social contribution
rate had reached a combined rate of 19.6% of gross wages, with
employers contributing 12.8% and employees contributing 6.8%.71
Mandatory health insurance continues to be funded in large part by
employer wage-based social contributions.72 In 2013, the employer
contribution rate is 13.1%,73 and employer contributions account for
about 47% of the mandatory health insurance system’s revenues.74 For
the most part, the employee wage-based social contribution, which has
fallen from 6.8% in 1992 to 0.75% of gross earnings in 2013,75 has been
replaced by an earmarked tax, the general social contribution
(contribution sociale géneralisée or CSG).76 The CSG is based on total
income, with the rate depending on the source of income.77 It is

69. When the system was originally enacted, there was a cap on the wages against which
health insurance contributions would be levied. PALIER, supra note 67, at 81. The cap was
gradually eliminated between 1967 and 1984. Rémi Pellet, L’évolution du financement de
l’assurance maladie: Bilan et perspectives [Financing French Health Insurance: Evolution and
Perspectives] 76 Revue d’Économie Financière 87, 92 (2004); Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 66.
But cf. Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform: Fundamental Restructuring or Incremental
Change?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 341, 355 (2007) [hereinafter Social Security Reform]
(discussing maximum taxable wage base under U.S. Social Security system).
70. See Steffen, supra note 4, at 363-66.
71. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 66; PAUL V. DUTTON, DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSES: A
COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
FRANCE 201 (2007). But cf. RODWIN & SANDIER, supra note 56, at 177 & n. 25 (stating that since
1992, employers pay 12.8% of the wage bill and employees pay 6.9% of their full salary, bringing
the total payroll tax for health insurance to 19.7% of all wages.”).
72. “Although there seems to be a consensus on the need for a reform to employers’
contributions, the experts remain cautious because of the economic and technical problems of
alternatives, whether in the form of a ‘social value-added tax’ (VAT) or generalized fiscalization.”
Steffen, supra note 4, at 366.
73. Taux en vigueur pour les salaries versés à partir du 1er janvier 2013, (stating that
effective January 1, 2013, the employer social contribution is levied at the rate of 13.1%), available
at http://www.lexisnexis.fr/services_gratuits/indices_taux/charges_sociales_salaires.html. Lower
rates and even exemptions may be available for unskilled or low cost jobs and for handicapped
employees. See also Steffen, supra note 4, at 357; Gérard Cornilleau and Thierry Debrand, Crise et
deficit de l’assurance maladie: Faut-il changer de paradigme?, La Revue de L’OFCE 315, 325
(Janvier 2011).
74. See Steffen, supra note 4, at 357.
75. Taux en vigueur pour les salaries versés à partir du 1er janvier 2013, (stating that
effective January 1, 2013, the employee social contribution is levied at the rate of 0.75%), available
at http://www.lexisnexis.fr/services_gratuits/indices_taux/charges_sociales_salaires.html.
76. Id. at 66. The CSG was introduced in 1991,and the rate and base have progressively
expanded. Steffen, supra note 4, at 366. The CSG was intended to (1) be employment-friendly,
reducing the burden of employment-based taxes; (2) reinforce social equity by expanding the tax
base, and (3) raise revenue to reduce the social security deficit. Gentile, supra note 55, at 152.
77. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 66.
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generally 7.5% on earned income,78 8.2% on capital,79 9.5% on
gambling winnings, 6.6% on pensions, and 6.2% on benefits.80
Employees’ income-related contributions constitute about 37% of the
systems’ revenues. 81 The remaining 16% of the systems’ revenues
come from a variety of other sources such as taxes on tobacco, alcohol,
and pharmaceutical companies.82
B. Second Tier—Voluntary Health Insurance
Mandatory basic health insurance covers about three-quarters of
health expenditures in France.83 Remaining costs are covered by
voluntary health insurance and individual patients.84
First instituted in the mid-19th Century, voluntary health insurance
predates the first tier mandatory health insurance system. 85 By the start
of World War II, mutuelles provided voluntary health insurance
coverage to about two-thirds of the French population.86 Today, about
88% of the French population has voluntary private health insurance,
and another 7% of the population has voluntary health insurance through
the public Couverture Maladie Universelle Complémentaire (CMU-C)
program.87 Effective January 1, 2016, complementary employment78. 5.1% goes toward mandatory health insurance. Id. at 66-67. The CSG rate on earned
income is reduced to 3.8% of earned income for low-income individuals who are exempt from
income tax, which is about half of French households. Id. at 67.
79. 5.95% goes toward mandatory health insurance. Id.
80. Id.
81. Steffen, supra note 4, at 357.
82. Id. For a breakdown of the other taxes and their relative contribution to revenues, see
Chevreul et al., supra note 37, at 67-68 & tbl. 3.12; see also DURAND-ZALESKI & CHEVREUL, supra
note 10, at 47 (identifying sources of revenue and their relative contributions) .
83. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 43; Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24.
84. France is ranked third among OECD countries in the share of health care financed by
private health insurance. Only the U.S. and the Netherlands have a higher share of health care costs
financed by private insurance. Buchmeueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 7. In 2007, the
national health insurance funds covered 76.6% of personal health expenditures, state and local
authorities covered 1.4%, mutual benefit funds 7.9%, insurance companies 3.2%, employersponsored health benefit schemes 2.5%, and households 8.4%. Steffen, supra note 4, at 365 tbl. 1.
Cf Chevreul, et al., supra note 10, at 65 (complementary insurance “covers about 13.4% of total
health expenditures (7.7% by mutual insurance associations, 3.3% by private insurance companies,
and 2.5% by provident institutions)” and private households pay about 6.8%).
85. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 20 (discussing the mutual benefit movement which
started in the 19th century and whose membership had grown to nearly 10 million members by
1940).
86. See Buchmueller and Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 8.
87. See Chevreul et al, supra note 10, at 71, 73 (stating that by 2006, 88% of the French
population had private voluntary health insurance and 7% of the French population had CMU-C so
that 95% of the French population had complementary health insurance). Cf. Steffen, supra note 4,
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based health insurance will become mandatory under the “Law for the
security of employment” (“Loi de Sécuritisation del’Emploi”) enacted
on June 14, 2013.88
1. Types of Voluntary Private Health Insurance
Commentators and policymakers often divide voluntary private
health insurance into three different types: (1) substitutive, (2)
complementary, and (3) supplementary.89 As its name suggests,
substitutive health insurance substitutes or replaces first tier mandatory
health insurance.90 It provides coverage for individuals who are
excluded from the first tier mandatory health insurance program.91
Complementary insurance provides coverage for services excluded or
not fully covered by first tier mandatory health insurance.92 For
example, it may pick up the cost of co-payments or cover services, such
as dental services, that are excluded from the first tier. Finally, like
complementary insurance, supplementary insurance may cover services
that are excluded or not fully covered by first tier mandatory health
insurance.93 Its principal purpose, however, is to increase the choice of
providers and thus provide insureds with faster access to care.94 It may
also provide insureds with a higher level of inpatient hotel amenities,
such as private rooms.95
In France, voluntary private health insurance is “complementary.”96
For the most part, it simply covers co-payments for services covered by
the first tier public health insurance;97 although recently private health
at 358 (stating that about 93% of the French population and 96% of French employees have
voluntary complementary insurance).
88. Labor Law Reform Act, supra note 11.
89. See, e.g., Sarah Thomson & Elias Mossialos, Private health insurance and the internal
market, in HEALTH SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND
POLICY 419, 421-23 (Mossialos et al. eds., 2010). Not all commentators use the terms in an
identical fashion, however. See supra note 12.
90. See, e.g., Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 422-23.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 422.
93. What are the equity, efficiency, cost containment and choice implications of private
health-care funding in Western Europe?, supra note 12, at 9.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 8 (“Private health insurance serves a
complementary function in the French system, reimbursing patients for cost-sharing required by the
public system and for medical goods and services for which public reimbursement levels fall below
market-determined prices.”).
97. DURAND-ZALESKI, supra note 10, at 40; see also Steffen, supra note 4, at 362
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insurance providers have extended coverage to services and amenities
that are not covered by the basic health insurance system.98 Unlike in
other countries, private health insurance in France is not
“supplementary;” that is, it “is not used to jump public sector queues or
to obtain access to elite providers.”99
Voluntary private health insurance may be purchased by individuals
or through group contracts.100 About half of voluntary private health
insurance contracts are purchased through the group insurance market by
employers providing job-related benefits.101
2. Public Provision of Voluntary Health Insurance
When CMU extended first tier public health insurance to all legal
residents of France in 2000, it also introduced CMU-C, free public
complementary health insurance for low-income individuals.102 CMU-C
(according to a 2007 study by the Ministry of Health, two-thirds of mutual benefit societies’
“contracts provide full reimbursement for those medical services partially reimbursed by national
health insurance, without offering any services that are not at all covered by the latter”).
98. DURAND-ZALESKI & CHEVREUL, supra note 37, at 48; see also Chevreul et al., supra
note 10, at 70 (“With the wide development of a market that is almost saturated, a few VHI
providers recently extended complementary coverage. These providers may compete on offering
contracts that cover goods and services not covered by SHI, such as omega-3 fatty acids and surgery
for short-sight.”).
99. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 69.
100. See id. at 71.
101. See IMAI ET AL., supra note 9, at 126, n.3; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at
14. See also Kilborn, supra note 57, at 572 (noting that in about 57% of cases, voluntary health
insurance is paid for by employers); Dominique Polton, Recent reforms affecting private health
insurance in France, EURO OBSERVER: NEWSLETTER OF THE EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON
HEALTH SYSTEMS AND POLICIES, Spring 2004, at 4 (stating that “[m]ore than 50% of VHI policies
are purchased through employers, who often pay a part of the premium as a fringe benefit”);
Francesca Columbo & Nicole Tapay, Private Health Insurance in OECD Countries: The Benefits
and Costs for Individuals and Health Systems 18, (OECD Health Working Papers No. 15, 2004)
(stating that about 50% of VHI is employment-based). Cf. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 71
(noting that according to a 2006 general population survey, 40% of privately insured individuals are
covered by a company group contract and that 85% of group contracts are sponsored by employers
who pay, on average, 60% of the premium); Michel Grignon & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, Income
and the Demand for Complementary Health Insurance in France 8, (Institut de Recherche et
Documentation en Économie de la Santé, Working Paper No. 24, 2009) (stating that according to
self-reports, 39% of contracts are purchased through an employer, 2% through a pool for the selfemployed, 39% are obtained through the non-group market and 15% are by retirees maintaining
coverage they had through their previous occupation); GLIED, supra note 2, at 40 (noting that “[i]n
France, supplemental job-based coverage accounts for about two-thirds of voluntary private health
insurance”).
102. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 72-73; see also Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra
note 15, at 7 (“This [CMU-C] coverage expansion addressed equity concerns relating to the fact that
lower income patients, who were less likely to have private complementary insurance or who held
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is available free of charge to individuals with an annual income below a
ceiling, equal to €7521 in January 2010.103 CMU-C is financed
principally by a tax on voluntary health insurance contract premiums, 104
and covered 7% of the French population in 2008.105 CMU-C
reimburses eligible individuals for tickets modérateurs, the co-payments
required under the first tier health insurance system, 106 and prohibits
doctors from charging CMU patients more than the statutorily agreed
rates.107 Prices that providers can charge CMU-C patients for eyeglasses
and dental prostheses are capped, and CMU-C pays the share of covered
patients’ costs that are not covered by the first tier health care system.108
CMU-C beneficiaries may choose to receive their complementary
coverage through the statutory system or through a private health
insurer.109
In order to assist low-income individuals who do not qualify for
CMU-C coverage, a voucher system was created in 2004 to help
individuals with incomes below a ceiling equal to 120% of the CMU
ceiling to purchase voluntary health insurance.110 The assistance
increases with an individual’s age ranging from €100 for individuals
under age twenty-five to €400 for individuals over sixty in 2010.111 In
2008, only 380,000 out of 2.2 million eligible individuals used the
voucher system.112

contracts with limited benefits, tended to face higher out-of-pocket costs than higher income
individuals, who had more complete private coverage.”); Michel Grignon et al., Does Free
Complementary Health Insurance Help the Poor to Access Health Care? Evidence from France, 17
HEALTH ECON. 203, 205 (2008) (noting that the French government introduced CMU-C “to help the
non-elderly poor access health care”).
103. See id. at 72-73. The income ceiling varies with the household size. It ranges from €7521
for individuals to €3760 per person for a household of six and €3008 for each additional household
member. Id. at 73, n.8.
104. Id. at 73.
105. Id. See also Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 15 (“A survey conducted in
2000 showed that CMU beneficiaries were younger, more frequently female and members of single
parent households than the general population. Compared with the target population, beneficiaries
are also more often unemployed or out of the labour force.”).
106. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 13.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 23 (noting that by December 2002, 15% of individuals were covered by a private
plan).
110. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 73.
111. Id.
112. Id; see also Michel Grignon & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, supra note 101, at 7 (noting
that only between 10 and 20% of the target population has taken advantage of the voucher system
and investigating the reasons for the low up-take).
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3. Benefits
Unlike mandatory health insurance benefits, voluntary health
insurance benefits are not uniform.113 Most voluntary health insurance
fully reimburses patients for the cost of covered drugs, other than those
considered to be “of low medical benefit,” and for the cost of procedures
and tests up to the statutorily agreed rate.114 About 25% of doctors work
in “Sector 2” and are permitted to charge fees that exceed the statutorily
agreed rates.115 Voluntary contracts differ on the amount that they will
reimburse with respect to charges that exceed the statutorily agreed rate,
often referred to “balance-billing.”116 In addition, voluntary contracts
differ with respect to reimbursement rates for low-benefit drugs, medical
devices, private amenities, and services not covered by the first tier
health insurance regime.117 Group contracts tend to provide better
coverage than do individual contracts,118 and higher paid individuals
tend to have better and more complete coverage than do lower paid
workers.119
Recently, the French government introduced some degree of
uniformity in the voluntary private health insurance market by providing
financial incentives to voluntary health insurance providers that enter
into “responsible contracts” (contrats responsible).120 In order to qualify

113. For a discussion of the various types health insurance offered to employees, see Camille
Francesconi et al., Company supplementary health insurance: Compulsory or voluntary schemes,
avoiding adverse selection and its effect on employees, QUESTIONS D’ÉCONOMIE DE LA SANTÉ, Nov.
2006, No. 115.
114. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 70. Nearly all private health insurance contracts
also pay the per diem co-payment for in patient hospital stays. There is, however, considerable
variation in coverage for the cost of private rooms. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at
10.
115. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 97-98. The proportion of “Sector 2” doctors varies
by speciality. Only 8% of general practitioners are Sector 2 doctors while 75% of surgeons work in
“Sector 2.” Id; see also Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 10 (“Roughly one quarter of
French physicians have the right to charge more than the conventional tariff; about 11% of GP visits
and 33% of specialist visits lead to balance billing.”).
116. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 70; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 11.
117. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 70; Grignon & Kambia-Chopin, supra note 101, at
6.
118. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 71.
119. See RODWIN & SANDIER, supra note 56, at 193, n.26; Thomson & Mossialos, supra note
89, at 3; Buchmueller & Couffinal, supra note 15, at 13; see also Kilborn, supra note 57, at 572 (“In
2000, coverage rates ranged from 72% of unskilled workers to 85% of office employees to 94% of
teachers, administrators, and other intermediate and managerial ‘white collar’ workers . . . . In 2000,
the rate of those either uninsured or underinsured ranged from just under 40% of those earning
$1500 or more per month to over 70% of those earning less than $750 per month.”).
120. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 71. Premiums from responsible contracts are exempt

MOORE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

474

9/22/2013 8:42 PM

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:459

as a responsible contract, voluntary health insurance must not cover the
mandatory health insurance co-payments that were introduced in 2005
(€1 for every doctor visit and test up to €4 per day and €50 per year and
€2 for medical transport and €0.50 for each drug, up to a second €50
ceiling) or the additional co-insurance and co-payment fees imposed
when patients do not use the new registered gatekeeping physician
process.121 On the other hand, if patients do use the new registered
gatekeeping physician process, responsible contracts must cover 100%
of physician fees, at least 95% of the costs of important drugs covered at
the 65% level by mandatory health insurance, and at least 95% of the
cost of laboratory tests covered by mandatory health insurance. 122 In
addition, responsible contracts must cover at least two important types of
preventive services from a defined list.123 By 2006, almost all voluntary
health insurance contracts were “responsible contracts.”124
4. Types of Providers
Three types of organizations offer voluntary health insurance in
France: (1) non-profit mutuelles which account for almost 60% of the
market, (2) non-profit provident institutions which account for 15 to
20% of the market, and (3) commercial for-profit insurance companies
which account for about 20% of the market.125
i. Mutuelles
Mutuelles, which date to the mid-19th Century, played a key role in
insuring the French population prior to the enactment of the French
Social Security system.126 Although mutuelles were not chosen to
manage the first tier mandatory health care system, they played – and
from a 7% tax that would otherwise apply. Id., at 70. “Solidarity contracts” (contrats solidaires) are
also exempt from this 7% tax. Solidarity contracts are contracts that do not require a health
questionnaire or base premiums on pre-existing health conditions. Id.
121. Id. at 71.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 17. Generally, the elderly are more likely
to be covered by mutuelles, farmer households are more likely to be covered by commercial
insurance companies, and executives are more likely to be covered by provident institutions. See
Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 76.
126. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 8. “In 1900 there were roughly 13,000
mutuelles covering over 2 million people and by the start of World War II, two-thirds of the
population had coverage for illness.” Id.
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continue to play – an important role in the development of voluntary
private health insurance in France.127
Mutuelles are non-profit organizations that emphasize mutual aid
and solidarity.128 They generally offer open enrollment, lifetime
coverage,129 and use community-rated premiums or base premiums on a
percentage of income rather than using risk-rating or risk selection
strategies.130 Complementary health insurance is the principal focus of
business for most mutuelles, and they are financed almost entirely by
subscriber fees and payments.131
Mutuelles may be organized along occupational lines or geographic
lines.132 For example, mutuelles may cover particular “groups of public
sector employees such as teachers,” while others cover individuals who
live in a particular geographic area.133 Enrollment is fairly evenly
divided between individual and group contracts.134
ii. Provident Institutions
Provident institutions were initially created to provide retirement
and other social insurance benefits to employees.135 About fifty-one
such institutions offer complementary health insurance, which accounted

127. Id. (“That history and the fact that the mutuelles have continued to play an important role,
not only as market participants, but in influencing the public policy environment, are important
factors that explain the high rate of private insurance coverage in France today.”).
128. Id. at 18.
129. Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 454.
130. Id.; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 18; Cf. Chevreul et al., supra note 10,
at 75 (stating that mutual insurance companies “avoid, as much as permitted by competition,
differentiation in premiums for a given level of coverage. For this reason, they make limited use of
risk rating. Moreover, some mutual companies also adjust their premium according to income.”)
The Code de la Mutualité limits the factors that can be taken into account in determining premiums
to the following: “[I]ncome, the time span since the initial subscription of a contract, the health
insurance fund that the subscriber is a member of, the location, the number of beneficiaries, and
their age.” Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 20.
131. In 2000, 95% of mutuelles’ outlays were for complementary health insurance. “Other
activities include the provision of other types of social insurance such as disability and life
insurance. Some mutuelles also operate different types of facilities including pharmacies, optical
care clinics and retirement homes.” Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 18 & n. 21.
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75 (“[Provident institutions] were created at
the end of the Second World War to manage the supplementary retiree pensions for senior
executives and intellectual professionals . . . . They progressively enlarged their activity to the
coverage of ‘heavy risk’ and finally offered [voluntary health insurance].”).
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for about half of the industry’s revenues in 2002.136 Provident
institutions principally offer group contracts,137 and individual
organizations tend to focus on particular industries or professional
groups.138
iii. Commercial Insurance Companies
Unlike mutuelles and provident institutions, commercial insurance
companies operate for profit, and complementary health insurance is
only a small portion of the industry’s business.139 Unlike mutuelles,
commercial insurance companies use risk-rating strategies (such as
taking health status into account) to rate premiums.140 Commercial
insurance contracts are more or less evenly divided between individual
and group contracts.141
iv. Regulation of Providers
Mutuelles are regulated by the mutual insurance code (code de la
mutualité) while provident institutions are regulated principally by the
Social Security code (code de la sécurité sociale)142 and commercial
insurance companies are regulated by the commercial insurance code.143
Traditionally, the most significant difference in the regulatory regimes
related to tax treatment;144 specifically, mutuelles and provident
institutions were exempt from the health insurance premium tax.145 In

136. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 18-19.
137. Id. at 19; see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75 (“[Provident institutions]
specialize in providing group contracts for companies that have a policy of mandatory enrolment in
[voluntary health insurance] for their employees.”).
138. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 19 (stating that mandatory contracts account
for half of provident institutions’ activity).
139. See id. at 19. (“In the life and health insurance industry, complementary health insurance
represents less than 5% of total revenue.”).
140. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75. Unlike the traditional practice of mutuelles,
commercial insurance carriers, which entered the market in force in the 1980s, “practiced risk-based
pricing, varying premiums with age and according to the results of medical questionnaires.
Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 21.
141. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75 (stating that sixty percent of business is in individual
contracts and forty percent is in group contracts); Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 19
(“Group and individual contracts account for comparable numbers of contracts.”).
142. Individual contracts offered by provident institutions are regulated by the commercial
insurance code. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75.
143. Id.
144. Buchmueller & Couffinal, supra note 15, at 19.
145. Id.; Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 453.
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addition, mutuelles were traditionally subjected to less rigorous solvency
rules.146
Both the differential tax treatment and less rigorous solvency rules
were found to violate the European Union’s Third Non-life Directive
regulating private health insurance and requiring equal treatment of all
insurers.147 In response, the French government tightened up the
solvency rules applicable to mutuelles148 and replaced the tax exemption
for mutuelles and provident institutions with a tax exemption for
“solidarity” and “responsible” contracts.149 “Solidarity” contracts are
contracts that do not require a health questionnaire or base premiums on
pre-existing health conditions.150 “Responsible” contracts are contracts
that, among other things, do not provide reimbursement for the
mandatory co-payment fees and gatekeeping differentials introduced in
2005.151 Any provider, including a commercial insurance company that
offers a “solidarity” or “responsible” contract is now exempt from the
insurance premium tax.152
III. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYER IN THE FRENCH HEALTH INSURANCE
SYSTEM
The employer plays an important role in the French health
insurance system in three ways. First, employer contributions account
for a little less than fifty percent of the funding of the first tier mandatory
health care system.153 Second, employers help administer the first tier
health funds.154 Finally, about half of second tier voluntary private
health insurance is purchased in the group market through employers as
job-related benefits.155

146. Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 450.
147. See id. at 450, 453.
148. Id. at 451; see Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 20.
149. Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 453-54. In 2007, the European Commission
launched a formal investigation into the “solidarity” and “responsible” contract. Id. at 454.
150. See id. at 454; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 19. This requirement
automatically applies to mutuelles and It is thought that most contracts now satisfy these
requirements. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 19-20.
151. See supra Part II.B.3.
152. See Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 455.
153. See Steffen, supra note 4, at 357.
154. See Sorum, supra note 5, at 232.
155. See Kilborn, supra note 57, at 572.
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A. Funding of Mandatory Health Insurance
At the time the French Social Security system was originally
enacted, there were two basic approaches to social protection: the British
“Beveridgean” model and the German “Bismarckian” model.156 Under
the Beveridgean model, the main policy objective is the prevention of
poverty. 157 Under the Bismarckian system,158 the main policy objective
is income maintenance for employees.159 In structuring their Social
Security system, the French deliberately elected to adopt a Bismarckian
system rather than a Beveridgean model.160
Consistent with the Bismarckian model, the French elected to fund
their Social Security system, including health care benefits, exclusively
with wage-based social contributions imposed on both employers and
employees.161 There were two reasons underlying the decision to fund
benefits exclusively with social contributions. First, the French feared
that social policy might take a backseat to financial considerations if
Social Security were funded by general taxes.162 Second, and more
importantly, the French believed in the social insurance model,163 which
requires that the individuals benefitting from the plan be the ones paying

156. See Giuliano Bonoli & Bruno Palier, Reclaiming Welfare: The Politics of French Social
Protection Reform, in SOUTHERN EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES 240, 242 (Martin Rhodes ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Reclaiming Welfare].
157. Id. at 242 (“[I]n France, a Beveridgean system is seen as one in which benefits are
directed at the whole population, are typically flat-rate and are financed through taxation.”).
158. The Bismarckian model is sometimes referred to as a “corporatist conservative” regime
or “occupational welfare state.” See id. at 243.
159. Id. at 242. (“[A] Bismarckian welfare state is one which typically grants earnings-related
benefits, where entitlement is conditional upon a contribution record and financing is provided by
employers’ and employees’ contributions.”).
160. PALIER, supra note 67, at 81; Sorum, supra note 5, at 232; see Gentile, supra note 55, at
135 & n.167 (discussing universalist aspirations of French social security system but noting that
system’s goal was security and income maintenance, not redistribution).
161. See supra Part II.A.6.
162. PALIER, supra note 67, at 81. A similar concern has been raised in debates regarding the
funding of the U.S. Social Security system. See Social Security Reform, supra note 69, at 359-60
(“[C]ritics of general revenue financing fear . . . that [it] might erode public support for the program
by drawing it more explicitly into annual budget debates.”).
163. See Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 246 (“The use of funds collected through
taxation in order to finance the social insurance system is not seen as legitimate. Conversely,
money collected through contributions cannot be used to finance assistance (or solidarité nationale)
that is, to benefit people who have not contributed to the social insurance system.”); see also
Lawrence H. Thompson & Melinda M. Upp, The Social Insurance Approach and Social Security, in
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 6-7 (Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds., 1997)
(identifying “contributory financing” as one of seven characteristics typically included in social
insurance).
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for it.164
Over the years, a number of Beveridgean elements have been
incorporated into the French mandatory health insurance system.165 For
example, in 2000, CMU extended basic health insurance to all legal
residents of France, regardless of employment status or prior
contributions to Social Security.166 As the mandatory health care system
has incorporated Beveridgean elements, funding has shifted from a
purely contributory system to a system partially funded by general
taxes.167 For example, the employee share of wage-based social
contribution funding168 has been largely replaced with a general social
contribution that is levied on total income, not just wages.169
Wage-based social contributions, however, have not been entirely
eliminated.170 Employers remain subject to a 13.1% wage-based social
contribution, which accounts for about 47% of the mandatory health
insurance system’s revenues.171

164. PALIER, supra note 67, at 81.
165. Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 243 (recognizing the incorporation into the
French system of a non-contributory, Beveridgean element into their system to provide for
individuals who do not have access to insurance benefits); Sorum, supra note 5, at 234 (“Like other
developed countries, however, France had evolved its own particular blend of Bismarck and
Beveridge, of public and private, and of centralization and decentralization.”). See generally Bruno
Palier & Guiliano Bonoli, Entre Bismarck et Beveridge: <<Crises>> de la sécurité sociale et
polique(s), 45 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 668 (1995) (Fr.) [hereinafter Entre
Bismarck et Beveridge] (providing a detailed discussion of the mix of Bismarckian and Beveridgean
elements in the French social security system).
166. See Sorum, supra note 5, at 234.
167. Cf. Giuliano Bonoli and Bruno Palier, Changing the Politics of Social Programmes:
Innovative Change in British and French Welfare Reforms, 8 J. OF EUR. SOC. POL’Y 317, 327
(1998) [hereinafter Changing the Politics] (“What these measures have in common is that they
contribute to change the original Bismarckian nature of the French social security system, and move
towards a state-run, tax-financed system, at least in the area of health care and family benefits.”).
168. The employee share of wage-based social contributions has fallen from 6.8% of gross
earnings in 1994 to .75% of gross earnings in 2013. See DUTTON, supra note 71, at 201 (stating that
employee share of social contributions was 6.8% in 1994; Charges socials sur salaries: Taux en
vigueur pour les salaries versés
à partir du 1er janvier, LEXISNEXIS,
http://www.lexisnexis.fr/services_gratuits/indices_taux/charges_sociales_salaires.html (last visited
April 24, 2013) (stating that effective on January 1, 2013, the employee social contribution is levied
at the rate of .75%).
169. See supra Part 2.A.6. In addition, a small portion of the mandatory health insurance
system is funded by taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and pharmaceutical companies.
170. See supra Part 2.A.6.
171. See supra Part 2.A.6. There has, however, been debate about alternative forms of
employer financing. See Pellet, supra note 69, at 121-27.
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B. Administration of Mandatory Health Insurance Funds
In a traditional Bismarckian system, employer and employee
representatives coadminister the health insurance funds and are fully
responsible for the system’s management and financial stability.172
Thus, when the French mandatory health insurance system was
originally created, it, like any traditional Bismarckian system, was to be
independent of the state and jointly administered by employer and
employee representatives.173 The decision to confer management
authority to employee and employer representatives (often referred to as
the social partners) was motivated in large part by mistrust of the state174
and justified by the fact that employees and employers fund the system
and thus have an interest in it.175
In fact, however, the government has long played an important
policymaking role in the French first tier mandatory health insurance
system.176 For example, the government sets the health insurance
premium levels177 and establishes the statutory rates that health care

172. Steffen, supra note 4, at 355.
173. PALIER, supra note 67, at 81; Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 244; Sorum, supra
note 5, at 232. When the health insurance system was originally created, there were more employee
representatives than employer representatives in the governing boards of the health insurance funds.
Now, there are an equal number of employee and employer representatives, and more importantly,
there are four representatives appointed by the government as well as one or two representatives of
mutual and family associations. Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 256.
174. PALIER, supra note 67, at 84. (stating that the French mistrusted the state because of its
lack of flexibility and adaptability and its bureaucratic structure).
175. Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 244.
176. According to Simone Sandier, Valérie Paris, and Dominique Polton,
Traditionally . . . the state handled policy concerning public hospital and drugs, while the health
insurance funds took charge of independent (private) medical practice (including the services
provided by self-employed professionals and private for-profit hospitals) on the basis of negotiated
agreements. Decisions concerning the financing of health insurance funds (conditions and levels of
social contributions) were clearly within the state’s remit.
SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 140; see also PALIER, supra note 67, at 142-48 (describing the
three-party (tripartisme) governance of the social security system under which governance is shared
by employer organizations, trade unions representing employees, and the government); Pellet, supra
note 69, at 108 (stating that since the social security system was created in 1945, the state has had
the responsibility for financial stability of the health care system; the social partners have only had
responsibility for the managing the administrative budget of the health care funds).
177. See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 137 (“[T]”he French health insurance funds have
never really had the management responsibilities accorded to sickness funds in the German health
care system. The state rapidly took responsibility for the financial and operational management of
health insurance (for example, setting premium levels and the price of goods and services, etc.).”);
see also Steffen, supra note 4, at 360 (“Health insurance thus started without institutional autonomy
and no control over the amounts of contributions, rates of reimbursement, and the rates applied by
doctors.”).

MOORE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

FRENCH AND U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS

9/22/2013 8:42 PM

481

providers may charge for their services.178 The government also
oversees national negotiations between the principle mandatory health
insurance regimes and health care providers in order to ensure that all
providers are subject to uniform reimbursement policies.179 Moreover,
since 1996, the total social security budget has been set in advance each
year by parliamentary vote, and the Parliament votes for the target rate
of growth for ambulatory care expenses and total health care
expenditures.180
The division of power between the government and the health
insurance funds has long been problematic,181 and as funding of the
system has shifted from pure wage-based social contributions to more
general tax-based financing, the social partners’ justification for
controlling the system has weakened while the state’s right to control the
system has increased.182 Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, the social
partners have objected to the shift away from wage-based financing and
the concomitant dilution of their power to regulate the health care
funds.183
In sum, employers play a role in managing the first tier health
insurance funds.184 Their powers, however, are circumscribed,185 and
178. See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 97.
179. Victor G. Rodwin & Simone Sandier, Health Care Under French National Health
Insurance: A Public-Private Mix, Low Prices and High Volumes, in UNIVERSAL HEALTH
INSURANCE IN FRANCE: HOW SUSTAINABLE? 169, 175 (2006). Different reimbursement rates apply
to the Alsace-Moselle region’s local scheme as well as certain public sector schemes. Bellanger et.
al., supra note 20, at S24.
180. Lise Rochaix & David Wilsford, State Autonomy, Policy Paralysis: Paradoxes of
Institutions and Culture in the French Health Care System, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 97, 113
(2005). In practice, however, the targets are not mandatory and are regularly surpassed. Id. at 114;
see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 85-87 (discussing the national ceiling for mandatory
health insurance expenditures).
181. See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 141 (“[T] division of responsibilities remains
unclear, and in recent years relations between state authorities and the health insurance funds have
been marked by periods of open conflict, with the trend towards increased state control regularly
denounced by the health insurance funds.”).
182. See Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 253; Entre Bismarck et Beveridge, supra note
165, at 327.
183. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 71, at 202 (“Employers and labor leaders alike understood
that if health insurance premiums were ‘fiscalized,’ that is, transferred to a generalized income tax,
their claims to control Sécurité Sociale governing boards would surely diminish. This was a
prospect to which they were determinedly opposed.”); PALIER, supra note 67, at 78 (discussing
trade union and employer objections).
184. See DUTTON, supra note 71, at 218-19 (“French union leaders and employers still exert
an influence over Sécurité Sociale that is out of all proportion to what should be a democratically
accountable institution of universal health coverage.”).
185. See Rochaix & Wilsford, supra note 180, at 101. (“[National Health Insurance] funds are
considered quasi-public agencies, as opposed to integrated organs of the state . . . . In truth, all the
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according to some authorities, employers play a minor role in creating
policy.186
C. Provision of Voluntary Health Insurance
About half of voluntary private health insurance contracts are
purchased through the group insurance market by employers providing
job-related benefits,187 and more than seventy percent of employees are
offered supplementary health insurance by their employer.188 On
average, employers pay about sixty percent of the cost of premiums for
voluntary health insurance.189 Employees can exclude the cost of
premiums paid by their employer from their income; although, there is
no tax advantage for the employee’s share of the premium or for the cost
of insurance purchased through the individual market.190 Effective
January 1, 2016, employers will be required to provide complementary
health insurance.191

laws governing sickness fund operations reserve ultimate authority to the French state, which
increasingly intervenes in the sickness funds’ decision making); Ph. R. Mossé, Towards A
Professional Rationalization: Lessons from the French Health Care System, 53 AM. J. ECO. & SOC.
129, 130 (1994) (“From an institutional point of view, the [National Social Security System] is an
independent and non profit organization managed by representatives of the employers and the labor
unions. Currently, however the State plays a great part in its regulation.”).
186. See Rochaix & Wilsford, supra note 180, at 101-02; Indeed, the Caisse Nationale de
l’Assurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salarié published a strategic plan proposing a number of
reforms. IMAI ET AL., supra note 9, at 124. Most of the reforms, however, required governmental
approval and legislation to implement. Id. at 125; Steffen, supra note 4, at 372-73 (“The funds’
former governing boards have been reduced to advisory organs and enlarged to include members
other than the social partners. It is now the director general who leads negotiations with the medical
unions on a program of objectives that the government board can only discuss. The central aspect
of the Bismarckian institution (i.e., self-government) has thus been eliminated.”).
187. See supra Part 2.B.1.
188. Francesconi et al., supra note 113, at 1.
189. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75.
190. See id. at 72 (“[F]iscal rebates are offered to employers that buy and offer group contracts
to their employees, while employees can [deduct] the cost of premiums from their taxable
income.”); Grignon & Kambia-Chopin, supra note 101, at 8 (“In France contributions paid for
directly by employers to a [complementary health insurance] contract are not taxed (even though
they could be considered in-kind wages) but there is no tax credit for individuals purchasing
[complementary health insurance] on the non-group market or on the employee’s share of the
contribution in the group market.”); Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 14, n.13 (“When
enrollment by employees is obligatory (which is true for roughly half of all employer-sponsored
health contracts) health insurance is considered a tax-deductible expense for employers and a taxfree benefit to employees. Additional payroll contribution rebates apply for the employers’
contribution to health insurance regardless of the mandatory characteristic. Tax deductions also
exist for the self-employed.”).
191. Labor Law Reform Act, supra note 11.
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IV. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYER IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
Like in France, the employer plays an important role in the U.S.
health insurance system. First, the employer plays an important role in
funding the U.S. mandatory health insurance system, Medicare.192 In
addition, the employer plays a critical role in providing voluntary health
insurance.193 Unlike in France, however, the employer plays no role in
administering Medicare, the mandatory health insurance program.194
A. Funding of Mandatory Health Insurance
Like France, the United States has a mandatory health insurance
program: Medicare, which is part of its Social Security system.195
Unlike in France, however, the U.S. mandatory health insurance
program does not extend coverage to the entire U.S. population. Instead,
coverage is limited to the elderly and disabled.196 While Medicare
covers almost the entire 65 and over population,197 it covers less than
18% of the nonelderly U.S. population.198
Medicare199 has two components: mandatory Hospital Insurance
(HI), otherwise known as Medicare Part A, and voluntary
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI), which consists of Medicare
Part B and Part D.200 Medicare Part A helps to pay for the cost of
hospital, home health, skilled nursing, and hospice care for the elderly
and disabled.201 Medicare Part B helps to pay for the cost of physician,
outpatient hospital, home health and other care for individuals who
voluntarily enroll in the program.202 Medicare Part D helps covers the

192. Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Medicare, 20 ELDER L.J. 1, 9 (2012).
193. See GLIED, supra note 2, at 37.
194. See Kaplan, supra note 192, at 9.
195. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq (2006).
196. THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. AND FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS,
2012 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT] (“In 2011,
Medicare covered 48.7 million people: 40.4 million aged 65 and older, and 8.3 million disabled.”).
197. See PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 376, SOURCES OF
HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 2012
CURRENT
POPULATION
SURVEY
4
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2012_No376_Sources1.pdf.
198. Id. at 5.
199. See generally Kaplan, supra note 192 (providing an overview of Medicare).
200. 2012 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 196, at 1. Medicare Part C provides a
voluntary alternative to Part A and Part B coverage. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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cost of drugs for covered individuals.203
About 85% of the funding of Medicare Part A comes from payroll
taxes,204 with employers and employees each paying a payroll tax equal
to 1.45% of total wages.205 Thus, about 42% of funding for Medicare’s
mandatory Part A program comes from employers.206 Beginning in
2013, the employer share will fall a bit as high-income workers will be
required to pay an additional 0.9% tax on their earnings above an
unindexed threshold of $200,000 for single taxpayers and $250,000 for
married couples.207
B. Voluntary Health Insurance
In the United States, about 60% of the population under the age of
65 is covered by employment-based health insurance.208 On average,
employers contribute 82% of the premiums for single coverage and 72%
of the premiums for family coverage.209 As in France, employees can
exclude the cost of premiums paid by their employer from their
income.210 In addition, unlike in France, employees can receive
favorable tax treatment with respect to their share of health care
premiums if their employer offers a cafeteria plan.211
Historically, the provision of employment-based health insurance
was purely voluntary.212 With the enactment of the Patient Protection
203. Id.
204. See id. at tbl.II.B1.
205. 26 U.S.C. § 3111(b)(6) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 3101(b)(6) (2006). Prior to 1994, Medicare,
like Social Security was subject to a wage cap, referred to as the taxabale wage base. Cf. Social
Security Reform, supra note 69, at 369 (discussing maximum taxable wage base under U.S. Social
Security system). Effective in 1994, the taxable wage base applicable to Medicare was eliminated so
that the Medicare tax now applies to all wages. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, § 13207, 107 Stat. 467 (1993) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006)).
206. Financing for voluntary parts B and D, in contrast comes from a combination of enrollee
premiums and general tax revenues. 2012 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 196, at 10
tbl.II.B1.
207. Id. at 10.
208. FRONSTIN, supra note 197, at 5 fig. 1 (showing that in 2011, 58.4% of the nonelderly
population was covered by employment-based health insurance coverage).
209. See GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC.
TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2012 ANNUAL SURVEY 72 (2012
210. See 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
211. See 26 U.S.C. § 125 (2006). See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L.
MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 131-33 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing
cafeteria plans and their effect on the taxability of employee contributions to fund employersponsored health care plans).
212. See generally Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance
After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 887-92 (2011)
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and Affordable Care Act,213 large employers that fail to offer health
insurance will be subject to an excise tax beginning in 2014.214 In
addition, beginning in 2018, an excise tax will be imposed on
employment-based health insurance that is too generous.215
IV. CONCLUSION
On the surface, the French health care system appears very different
from the U.S. system. Specifically, the French health care system has
first tier mandatory health insurance that covers the entire population216
while the only mandatory health insurance system in the United States,
Medicare, generally only covers the 65 and older population.217
Moreover, French employers play a role in managing the first tier health
insurance system218 while U.S. employers play no role in the
management of Medicare.219
Upon closer examination, however, the French and U.S. health care
systems are quite similar in that employers play an important role in both
countries’ health care systems. First, in both France and the United
States, employers’ wage-based contributions finance about half the costs
of mandatory health insurance.220 Second, employment-based voluntary
health insurance is quite prevalent in both countries.221
Although the two countries are similar in that employers play an
important role in their health care systems, that is not necessarily an
advantage. Indeed, the employment-based nature of health insurance in

[hereinafter Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance] (discussing the history of the
development of employment-based health insurance in the United States).
213. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 129 (2010);
see id. at 903 (discussing the likelihood that the Affordable Care Act will affect employers’
willingness to offer health insurance).
214. See Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 212, at 903. On July 2,
2013, the Obama Administration announced that it would delay until 2015 enforcement of the
excise tax on large employers who fail to offer health care coverage. Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear,
Crucial Mandate Delayed a Year for Health Law, N.Y. Times, July 3, 2013 at A1.
215. 26 U.S.C. § 4980I (Supp. 2011).
216. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 8; see also supra notes 13-15 and
accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see generally Future of Employment-Based
Health Insurance, supra note 212, at 892-902 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
employment-based health insurance in the United States).
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both countries has been subject to significant criticism.222
First, critics contend that employment-based financing of health
care reduces employers’ competitiveness and thus hinders employment
and economic growth.223 Indeed, the French government shifted from
the employee waged-based social contribution to the broader incomebased CSG to fund mandatory health insurance in large part because of
concerns regarding unemployment and employers’ competitiveness.224
Second, critics of employment-based health insurance contend that
employment-based health care contributes to the high cost of health
care.225 In 2010, health care costs in the United States constituted 17.6%
of GDP, the highest in the developed world.226 In France, health care
costs constituted 11.6% of GDP,227 two percentage points higher than
the OECD average of 9.5%,228 and third highest in the world.229
Critics of the employment-based health care system in the United
State object to its high administrative costs relative to a universal singlepayer system230 and contend that its favorable tax treatment creates an
incentive to overinsure and thus leads to increased health care costs.231
Effective in 2018, the Affordable Care Act will introduce an excise tax
on high-cost employment-based health insurance plans aimed at
reducing the incentive to overinsure.232 Whether the excise tax will be
222. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 71, at 218 (“[T]he single most imperative reform to U.S.
and French health care is to sever the obsolete link between employment and health security.”).
223. See id. at 219 (“Only if the link between health care financing and security from the
calculations of workers and employers is severed will health care cease to hinder employment and
economic growth.”); Gentile, supra note 55, at 145-47 (describing and refuting argument).
224. See Bonoli & Palier, supra note 156, at 252 (explaining that French government’s push to
transform mandatory health insurance system from employment-based system to universal, statemanaged and tax-financed one was driven in large part by “the desire to reduce contributions and ,
as a result, the cost of labour”).
225. See, e.g., Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 212, at 893-94.
226. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA 2012: HOW DOES THE
UNITED
STATES
COMPARE
1
(2012),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/BriefingNoteUSA2012.pdf.
227. Id.
228. See id. Health care spending as a share of GDP was much lower in France than in the
United States, which was 17.6% in 2010. Id. In addition, it was slightly than in the Netherlands
(twelve percent) and the same as in Germany. Id.
229. The only countries in which health care costs represent a higher percentage of GDP are
the United States and the Netherlands. Id. Like France, health care spending in Germany
constitutes 11.6% of GDP. Id. Interestingly, among OECD countries, the four countries in which
health care spending represented the highest percentage of GDP are also the four countries in which
private health insurance represented the highest percent of health expenditure in 2000. See
Columbo & Tapay, supra note 101, at 9 fig.1.
230. See Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 212, at 893-94.
231. See id.
232. Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans?, 65 TAX L. REV. 749,
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effective in reducing costs remains to be seen.233
Critics of the French health care system contend that
complementary health insurance (which is offered and funded in large
part by employers) has made it difficult to contain health care costs.234
When the French government instituted its mandatory health insurance
system, it required that individuals pay a portion of the cost of their care
(ticket modérateurs).235 The co-payments were intended to moderate
demand. 236 Because complementary health insurance typically covers
these co-payments,237 it eliminates their ability to reduce moral hazard so
as to rein in costs.238
The moral hazard created by complementary insurance may be
somewhat tempered by the additional flat co-payments that were
introduced in 2005 because the new flat co-payments may not be
reimbursed by complementary health insurance.239 They are unlikely,
however, to have a substantial impact on utilization given their relatively
modest size - €1 for every doctor visit and test up to €4 per day and €2
for each medical transport by ambulance or medical taxi and €0.50 for
each drug up to a second €50 ceiling.
A third criticism leveled against employment-based health care is
that it creates inequality in access to care. Lack of health insurance
coverage has been a serious problem in the United States. For example,
in 2011, 18% of the nonelderly population had no health insurance.240
The Affordable Care was enacted, in part, to address the lack of health
care coverage.241 It did not, however, eliminate employment-based
health care, and how effective it will be in extending health care
coverage to the entire U.S. population remains to be seen.
Although the first tier mandatory health insurance system covers
the entire French population, prior to the introduction of CMU-C, the
poor and unemployed were less likely to have complementary health
insurance and thus face out-of-pocket expenses when using health
749 (2012).
233. See generally id. (criticizing the new excise tax).
234. See, e.g., Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 15-17.; Gentile, supra note 55, at
132; SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 146.
235. See Gentile, supra note 55, at 132.
236. See supra Part 2.A.5.
237. See supra Part 2.B.3.
238. See generally Mark V. Pauly, Comment, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 531 (1968) (discussing moral hazard and the use of the deductible and co-payment to
reduce moral hazard).
239. See supra Part 2.A.5.
240. FRONSTIN, supra note 197, at 4.
241. See FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 211, at 94-95.
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care.242 Studies showed that that those who did not have complementary
health insurance did not consult doctors and dentists as frequently as
those who were covered by complementary health insurance nor were
they as likely to spend as much on pharmaceuticals.243 Critics of the
French health care system contended that complementary coverage
created inequality of access to health care.244 The French government
addressed this concern by extending CMU-C to the non-elderly poor.245
Although the French health care system has been ranked the best in
the world, the fact that employers play an important role in the system
does not appear to be a strength of the system. Instead, it may be the
greatest weakness in the system and exacerbate one of the most pressing
issues facing health care systems throughout the developed world,
escalating costs.

242. Grignon et al., supra note 102, at 205.
243. Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 435; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15,
at 15-16 & n.15 DUTTON, supra note 71, at 203 n.65.
244. Id. at 203 (“Albeit less pronounced, France’s comparable historical tradition of
workplace health coverage underlies inequities of health care access because of the continued
importance of supplemental insurance.”); Gentile, supra note 55, at 155 (“The disparity in
complementary coverage became one of the principle sources of inequality in the French health
system.”).
245. According to one study, it appears that CMU-C has increased utilization by newly
covered individuals. Grignon et al., supra note 102 at 217 (noting that individuals who enrolled in
the free plan had a significantly higher probability of using health care services and that this effect is
likely driven by those with no supplemental coverage prior to enrollment). Of course, extending
complementary coverage increases the likelihood that lower-income individuals will use health care
and thus increases costs. By extending complementary coverage, the French government has
chosen to enhance equity in coverage at the expense of efficiency. Buchmueller & Couffinhal,
supra note 15, at 19.

